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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze whether regulation reduced risk during the credit crisis and the 
sovereign debt crisis for a cross section of global banks. In this regard, we examine distance 
to default (Laeven and Levine, 2008), systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2010), idiosyncratic risk, 
and systematic risk. We employ World Bank survey data on regulations to test our 
conjectures. We find that regulatory restrictions, official supervisory power, capital 
stringency, along with private monitoring can explain bank risk in both crises. Additionally, 
we find that deposit insurance schemes enhance moral hazard, as this encouraged banks to 
take on more risk and perform poorly during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, official 
supervision and private monitoring explains the returns during both crisis periods. 
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1. Introduction 
Journalists, policymakers, and academics have argued that lenient regulations, reliance on 
short-term funding, excessive risk taking, and corporate governance failure are responsible 
for the recent crisis. This paper examines the impact of regulations on the risk and returns of 
global banks during the credit and sovereign debt crises. We examine an extensive sample of 
large international banks that are the targets of current regulatory efforts while many of them 
are considered to be too big to fail by central banks. These banks are characterized by their 
large capitalization, global activity, cross-border exposure, and/or representative size in the 
local industry. In this regard, we examine the determinants of distance to default (Laeven and 
Levine, 2008), systemic risk (marginal expected shortfall [MES] proposed by Acharya et al., 
2010), idiosyncratic risk, and systematic risk.  
 There is scant literature examining the impact of bank regulations on bank fragility 
and risk. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) use the adherence to the core principles 
from the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision and show that bank supervision and 
regulation have very little effect on bank risk. Barth et al. (2004) use the World Bank survey 
data II and show that countries with higher regulatory restrictions have a higher probability of 
experiencing a banking crisis. Barth et al. (2013) show that banking restrictions are 
negatively related to bank efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, no prior studies examine 
the impact of World Bank regulations on bank risk and return during the recent credit and 
sovereign debt crises. We fill this gap in the literature and take this opportunity to examine 
the effectiveness of World Bank regulations in terms of bank risk taking and returns.  
We use the 2008 World Bank survey on bank regulation data to examine whether 
lenient regulations were responsible for excessive risk taking by the banks, which led them to 
perform badly during the crisis (Stiglitz, 2010). The banking regulations survey contains 312 
questions on different dimensions, and most of the questions require yes/no type of answers. 
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We form scores for measuring different dimensions and following Beltratti and Stultz (2012) 
and Pasiouras et al. (2006), we classify the survey questions used into five categories: (1) 
capital regulations; (2) restrictions on bank activities; (3) official supervisory power; (4) 
private monitoring; and (5) deposit insurance. We test whether capital regulations, 
restrictions on bank activities, official supervisory power, private monitoring, and deposit 
insurance are related to risk and whether they affected the banks¶ stock performance during 
the credit and sovereign debt crises. We perform our tests on a number of different risk 
measurements.  
Our first measure of risk is the distance to default (log z), as in Laeven and Levine 
(2009). Log z measures the distance from bankruptcy (Roy, 1952). Since a large number of 
banks went bankrupt following the credit and sovereign debt crises, it is imperative and 
WLPHO\WRH[DPLQHZKHWKHUUHJXODWLRQVKDYHDQ\LPSDFWRQJOREDOEDQNV¶GLVWDQFHWRGHIDXOW
risk during these periods of turmoil. Our second measure of risk is the systemic measure of 
ULVN0(67KHXVHRILQGLYLGXDOEDQNV¶FRQWULEXWLRQWRV\VWHPLF risk is relatively new and 
allows us to test the effects of regulations during the credit and sovereign debt crisis. Most of 
the earlier empirical work has examined the relationship between regulation and systemic 
stability by using the incidence of banking crisis at the country level as a measure of systemic 
risk (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). We examine the impact of regulation on 
LQGLYLGXDOEDQNV¶FRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHRYHUDOOV\VWHPLFULVN Our third measure of risk is the 
idiosyncratic risk of banks. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) argue that banks have learned from 
previous financial crises, leading banks to change their behavior and protect themselves from 
a future financial crisis. In light of the regulatory changes that occurred after the credit crisis, 
we assess whether banks changed their business models by taking risk more sensibly, as 
FDSWXUHGE\LGLRV\QFUDWLFULVN2XUILQDOPHDVXUHRIULVNLVEDQNV¶V\VWHPDWLFULVNZKLFKLV
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estimated based on the market model. We also examine whether UHJXODWLRQVLPSDFWHGEDQNV¶
systematic risk during the credit and sovereign debt crisis. 
Bank supervisors form their assessments on bank risk based on their proprietary 
information. However, this information is accessed over infrequent intervals. Moreover, the 
daily change of market variables reflects bank risk in a timelier manner, but does not fully 
reflect all the information that is available to supervisors (Berger et al., 2000). Therefore, the 
information on bank risk, which is inherent in equity market variables, can complement 
supervisory assessment markets (Gunther et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2001; Elmer and Fissel, 
2001; Curry et al., 2001).To assess whether the market variables explain risk, we include 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) calculated before the credit and sovereign debt 
crises.1 Since return is the reward for taking risk, we evaluate the impact of regulations on 
EDQNV¶VWRFNSHUIRUPDQFH 
Our results show that restrictions, private monitoring, and deposit insurance explain 
the distance to default during the credit crisis, while official power and private monitoring 
had a consistent impact on banks during the sovereign debt crisis. However, we do not find 
any evidence of deposit insurance having an impact. Following the credit crisis, official 
VXSHUYLVRU\SRZHUKDVDVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWRQEDQNV¶GLVWDQFHWRGHIDXOW7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDW
countries with higher official power could take the necessary corrective actions and 
strengthen their banking system. Additionally, we find that deposit insurance explains the 
distance to default during the credit crisis, but not in the sovereign debt crisis. We argue that 
as sovereign states were affected during the sovereign debt crisis, they were unable to support 
banks at the time. Hence, banks in countries with deposit insurance schemes have a higher 
probability to default. 
                                                          
1 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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Regarding our second risk measurement (MES) we find that activity restrictions and 
deposit insurance explain MES during the credit and the sovereign debt crisis. Capital 
restrictions also explain MES but only during the sovereign debt crisis. This is due to the fact 
that not only Tier I capital requirements have increased, but the quality requirements of 
capital have also increased. After the credit crisis, there have been significant changes in 
terms of capital adequacy and stress testing. We find that banks in countries with stricter 
capital requirements have lower systemic risk contributions. 
The results on the third risk measurement, idiosyncratic risk, show that with greater 
official power and in the presence of deposit insurance schemes, banks take more risk 
resulting in higher idiosyncratic risk during the credit crisis. However, official power is no 
longer significant during the sovereign debt crisis. We argue that this could be due to the fact 
that banks became significantly fragile and therefore, regulators could not exert benefits 
anymore. Finally, we find a positive relationship between deposit insurance and idiosyncratic 
risk during both crisis periods, reinforcing the view that deposit insurance increases moral 
hazard. 
We also examine whether regulations impacted EDQNV¶V\VWHPDWLFULVNGXULQJWKH
credit and sovereign debt crisis. We find that higher official power results in banks having 
higher systematic risk. This suggests that rent extraction by the regulators is also reflected by 
market risk. Additionally, banks in countries with higher capital restrictions are more 
protected in case of financial turmoil, and private monitoring prevents banks from taking 
riskier decisions, as reflected by a lower systematic risk. These findings hold for both the 
credit and sovereign debt crises. BHAR is significant in most of the risk regressions, 
suggesting that market variables reflect bank risk in a timely manner. Hence, regulators 
should complement their decisions with the information inherent in market variables. Our 
results have other policy implications. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop the hypotheses. 
In section 3, we perform a descriptive analysis of the credit and the sovereign debt crises. 
Section 4 describes the variables used and employed methodology. Section 5 discusses the 
data sources and descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents the results on the impact of 
regulation on risk and returns during the credit and sovereign debt crises. In section 7, we 
conduct robustness checks. The conclusions are in section 8. 
 
2. Hypothesis development for testing the impact of regulations on bank risk and 
returns 
We take advantage of the 2008 World Bank survey on bank regulation data to examine 
whether lenient regulations were responsible for excessive risk taking by the banks, which led 
them to perform badly during the crisis. Following Beltratti and Stultz (2012) and Pasiouras 
et al. (2006), we classify the survey questions used into five categories: (1) capital 
regulations; (2) restrictions on bank activities; (3) official supervisory power; (4) private 
monitoring; (5) deposit insurance. Since, excessive risk taking is primarily blamed for the 
crisis (Beltratti and Stultz, 2012), in this section, we show that these five categories of 
regulations can relate to the risk-taking behavior of the banks. Therefore, we focus on these 
five categories of regulations to develop and test our hypotheses. Finally, due to the 
conflicting theoretical predictions, it is an empirical question whether bank regulations have a 
positive or negative impact on bank risk and returns. 
 2.1. Bank capital and capital regulation  
Core (Tier I) capital is at the focal point of banking regulation, as it helps banks when 
they face liquidity problems. Likewise, an index of regulatory capital oversight looks at the 
quality of regulatory capital held by the banks. In this section, we pay attention at the quantity 
and quality of regulatory capital. Previous research finds that stringent capital requirements 
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reduce banking risk (Fernandez and González, 2005). We test the importance of capital 
adequacy and respective capital-requirement regulations and how they can impact banks and 
their tendency on risk taking and performance during the recent crises.  
Bank regulations stress the benefits of capital adequacy requirements (Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1994), as adequate capital enables banks to absorb unexpected losses and thus 
remain solvent. Likewise, banks with limited liability are less prone to assume more risk with 
larger amounts of capital at risk. Berger et al. (1995) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) argue 
that capital adequacy requirements along with deposit insurance can have a significant effect 
on aligning the incentives of bank owners with those of depositors and other creditors. 
However, theory offers contradictory predictions as to whether the imposition of 
capital requirements will have positive effects (see Santos, 2001; Gorton and Winton, 2003). 
A number of studies argue that capital requirements may increase risk-taking behavior 
(Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; and 
Blum, 1999). Similarly, Thakor (1996) models the effect of risk-based capital requirements 
on bank asset allocation decisions when screening borrowers is costly. Assuming that equity 
capital is more expensive to raise than deposits, then an increase in risk-based capital 
UHTXLUHPHQWVUHGXFHVWKHEDQNV¶WHQGHQF\WRVFUHHQLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGLQFUHDVH
their lending. Gorton and Winton (2000) show that in a general equilibrium framework, the 
increase RIFDSLWDOUHTXLUHPHQWVKDVDQLQYHUVHLPSDFWRQEDQNV¶VXSSO\RIGHSRVLWVKHQFH
reducing the traditional liquidity-provision role of banks. 
We use the recent credit and sovereign debt crises and address the theoretical 
contradictions on capital adequacy requirements along with the shift on new risk-based 
capital requirements in Basel II and III accords. We do so by examining the impact of capital 
requirements, regarding Tier I capital, on bank risk and stock performance across countries. 
Alternatively, we use Capital, an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. This capital 
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index also includes indicators for capital sources, other than cash and government securities, 
that are included in regulatory capital and whether authorities verify the source of capital. 
During a crisis we expect the banks to benefit from higher capital requirements. Hence, our 
first hypothesis is: 
H1a: Higher capital requirements reduce bank risk during financial turmoil. 
+E+LJKHUFDSLWDOUHTXLUHPHQWVLQFUHDVHEDQNV¶VWRFNreturns during financial 
turmoil. 
2.2. Restrictions on Bank Activities 
If banks are allowed to do a broad range of activities they might engage in risky 
ventures that can be suboptimal for investors (Boyd et al., 1993). Restricting bank activities 
means imposing restrictions on activities and securities banks may hold. Since bank assets are 
opaque, during a financial turmoil the value of risky securities can decline significantly. 
Limiting risky undertakings may decrease the financial losses given the opacity of bank 
assets. However, the results of Barth et al. (2004) indicate the opposite: restricting bank 
activities is negatively related to bank stability and increases the probability of a banking 
crisis. Therefore, we examine the relationship between activity restrictions and risk taking 
and returns during the recent financial and sovereign debt crises as it can assist in assessing 
the effectiveness of restrictions.  
According to Barth et al. (2004), the reasoning for restricting bank activities and 
banking commerce rests on five hypothetical reasons. First, there can be significant conflicts 
of interest if banks are involved in diverse activities such as securities and insurance 
XQGHUZULWLQJDQGUHDOHVWDWHLQYHVWPHQW)RULQVWDQFHEDQNVPD\WU\WR³SXVK´VHFXULWLHVRI
troubled firms to uninformed investors (John et al., 1994; Saunders, 1985). Second, due to 
moral hazard, if banks are allowed to diversify their operations and range of activities, they 
will be more likely to engage in riskier investments, thus increasing their risk (Boyd et al., 
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1998). Third, the size and complexity of certain banks makes them difficult to monitor. 
Fourth, such banks may become so politically and economically powerful that they become 
³WRRELJWRGLVFLSOLQH´/DHYHQDQG Levine, 2007). Finally, large financial conglomerates can 
stifle competition and reduce banking efficiency (Barth et al., 2013). Based on these 
arguments, government supervision and regulation can improve banking by restricting bank 
activities. Moreover, these arguments imply a negative relationship between activity 
restrictiveness and bank risk and a positive relationship between return and activity 
restrictions. 
However, there are alternate theoretical reasons for permitting banks to engage in a 
broader range of activities. For instance, less supervisory restriction will allow banks to better 
utilize economies of scale and scope (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000). Moreover, fewer 
UHJXODWRU\UHVWULFWLRQVPLJKWLQFUHDVHWKHEDQNV¶IUDQFKLVHYDOXHWKXVLQFUHDsing their 
incentive to adopt prudent behavior. Finally, if banks are allowed to engage in a wider array 
of activities, this will increase their income diversification, resulting in better stability. The 
empirical evidence largely shows that restricting bank activities has adverse outcomes. In a 
cross-country investigation, Barth et al. (2001) find that more regulatory restrictions on bank 
actions are related to a higher probability of suffering a major banking crisis and lower 
banking sector efficiency. Barth et al. (2004) find that restricting bank activities is not related 
to less concentration, more competition, or greater securities market development. Barth et al. 
(2013) find that tighter restrictions are negatively associated with bank efficiency. What is 
more, bank restrictions can be designed in such a manner that they give regulators discretion 
and thus enhance their bargaining power for rent seeking (Djankov et al., 2002). In summary, 
there are contradicting views on the effects of activity restrictions, and therefore, we assess 
empirically the effect of activity restrictions during the credit and sovereign debt crises on 
bank risk and return. Our testable hypotheses are as follows: 
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H2a: Greater restrictions to banking activities reduce bank risk during financial 
turmoil. 
H2b: *UHDWHUUHVWULFWLRQVWREDQNLQJDFWLYLWLHVLQFUHDVHEDQNV¶VWRFNUHWXUQVGXULQJ
financial turmoil.  
2.3. Official Supervisory Power 
Supervisory power can affect risk taking, and during turbulent times, supervisors 
should be able to perform corrective actions. Stringent supervisory control can potentially 
prevent managers from engaging in excessive risk-taking behavior. There are evidence (e.g., 
Fernandez and González, 2005) and contra evidence (e.g., Barth et al., 2004) on that issue. 
Since we observe two crises with a short time lapse between them, and official supervisory 
power is a core part of World Bank regulations, we examine whether risk taking depends on 
monitoring and supervisory power.  
It is costly and difficult to monitor banks and yet too little monitoring would lead to 
suboptimal performance. Therefore, greater official supervision and monitoring can mitigate 
this suboptimal performance (Beck et al., 2006). Moreover, banks can be susceptible to bank 
runs and respective contagion due to information asymmetries. Supervision can reduce 
information asymmetries and help protect banks from potential bank runs to a certain extent. 
In addition, greater official supervision can help reduce the inherent moral hazard of deposit 
insurance schemes - as deposit insurance can lead banks to take excessive risks - and at the 
VDPHWLPHUHGXFHWKHGHSRVLWRUV¶LQFHQWLYHVIRUSULYDWHO\PRQLWRULQJWKHEDQNV,QWKLVUHJDUG
supervisory power is expected to be positively associated with bank returns and negatively 
associated with risk. 
To the contrary, powerful supervisors may use their powers to benefit favored voters, 
attract campaign donations, and extract bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 
2002; Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). Therefore, more powerful supervision can lead to 
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corruption and hurting bank performance and stability. Kane (1990) and Boot and Thakor 
(1993) focus on a different perspective, which is the agency costs between bank supervisors 
and taxpayers. Rather than focusing on political influence, Boot and Thakor (1993) model the 
behavior of a self-LQWHUHVWHGEDQNVXSHUYLVRUZKHQWKHUHLVXQFHUWDLQW\DERXWWKHVXSHUYLVRU¶V
ability to monitor banks. Under these settings, they show that supervisors might lead to 
socially suboptimal arrangements. Thus, greater supervision can hinder bank operations when 
FRQGLWLRQDORQEDQNVXSHUYLVRUV¶LQFHQWLYHVDQGWKHDELOLW\RIWD[SD\HUVWRPRQLWRU
supervision. As Beck et al. (2006) argue, if bank supervisory agencies have the authority to 
discipline noncompliant banks, the supervisors might use this power to induce or force banks 
to allocate credit so as to generate private or political benefits. As a consequence, supervisor 
power might be negatively associated with bank returns and positively associated with risk. 
During a crisis we expect banks to benefit from higher supervisory power. Our hypotheses on 
supervisory power are stated as follows: 
H3a: Greater supervisory power reduces bank risk during financial turmoil. 
+E*UHDWHUVXSHUYLVRU\SRZHULQFUHDVHVEDQNV¶VWRFNUHWXUQVduring financial 
turmoil. 
2.4. Private monitoring  
Apart from regulatory supervision and monitoring, shareholders can also monitor 
EDQNV¶RSHUDWLRQVDQGSHUIRUPDQFHDQGLQIOXHQFHWKHLUSROLF\WKURXJKLQYHVWRUV¶ monitoring 
ability. Related to this market-based view of regulations where market reward good banks 
and penalize bad ones, Fernandez and González (2005) find that regulations that promote and 
assist private monitoring of banks increase EDQNV¶ financial soundness by reducing moral 
hazard created by information asymmetries. Therefore, this section provides a discussion on 
KRZSULYDWHPRQLWRULQJFDQVXEVWLWXWHRUFRPSOHPHQWUHJXODWRUV¶VXSHUYLVLRQDQGDIIHFW
EDQN¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVULVNWDNLQJDQGSHUIRUPDQFH during the recent financial crisis.  
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Private monitoring can be motivated and enhanced by official bank supervisors. For 
instance, Barth et al. (2006) find that some regulatory agencies require banks to obtain 
certified audits and/or ratings from international rating agencies and to produce accurate, 
comprehensive, and consolidated information on the full range of their activities and risk 
management procedures. A set of countries also hold bank directors legally liable if 
information is erroneous or misleading. Also, some countries enact deliberately D³QRGHSRVLW
LQVXUDQFH´SROLF\WRVWLPXODWHSULYDWHPRQLWRULQJ1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHUHDUHRSSRVLQJYLHZV
regarding the role and impact of bank monitoring by the private sector. One view argues for 
greater reliance on private monitoring and against official supervision. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998) argue, regarding government regulations, that banks will put pressure on politicians 
who, in turn, can inappropriately exert influence on the supervisory oversight. Moreover, 
regulators do not invest their own wealth in banks, resulting in a divergence of their 
incentives, in terms of monitoring and disciplining banks, with those of private creditors. 
In contrast, another view argues for less reliance on private monitoring. Countries 
with under-developed capital markets and weak accounting standards and legal systems 
might not be able to rely effectively on private monitoring. Moreover, the fact that banks are 
complex and opaque institutions makes it difficult for private monitoring to keep up even in 
the most developed economies. Therefore, a greater reliance on private monitoring of banks 
may lead eventually to the exploitation of depositors and poor bank performance (Barth et al., 
2004). We explore the effect of these supervisory schemes on bank risk taking and 
performance during the credit and sovereign debt crises. Our hypotheses are as follows: 
H4a: Greater private monitoring reduces bank risk during financial turmoil. 
+E*UHDWHUSULYDWHPRQLWRULQJLQFUHDVHVEDQNV¶VWRFNUHWXUQVGXULQJILQDQFLDO
turmoil. 
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2.5 Deposit insurance 
During the credit crisis deposit insurance schemes came in the limelight and are 
considered as one of the tools in the UHJXODWRUV¶GLVSRVDOIRUpreventing the credit crisis from 
spreading further in the financial services system. On the other hand, the moral hazard in 
presence of deposit insurance induces banks to engage in excessive risk taking (Barth et al., 
2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) Therefore, in this section, we discuss how 
the presence of deposit insurance can affect risk taking and how it affects performance. The 
effectiveness and role of deposit insurance can be evaluated once a crisis happens. Hence, we 
examine the role of deposit insurance on risk taking by global banks during the credit and 
sovereign debt crises.  
In order to protect banks that experience liquidity problems but remain solvent, 
countries adopt deposit insurance schemes in order to prevent bank runs. Since deposit 
insurance can safeguard payment and credit systems overall, it enjoys a great number of 
supporters. Starting with Merton (1977), a number of theoretical papers have studied the 
relationship between deposit insurance and banking sector stability. This positive 
stabilization effect of deposit insurance obviously has greater importance during economic 
downturns when contagion is more likely to spread and bank runs are more likely to occur. 
Consistent with this view, Gropp and Vesala (2004) show that the adoption of deposit 
insurance is related to lower bank risk in the European Union. Similarly, Chernykh and Cole 
(2011) show that the adoption of deposit insurance in Russia created safer banks. For US 
credit unions, Karels and McClatchey (1999) find stabilization effects from the adoption of 
deposit insurance. Anginer et al. (2013) find that bank risk is lower during a crisis in 
countries with deposit insurance. 
However, deposit insurance may have adverse consequences, as it may encourage 
excessive risk-taking behavior, which might offset any stabilization benefits (Barth et al., 
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2004). There is also sizable agreement in the literature that deposit insurance enhances moral 
hazard problems in the banking sector by incentivizing banks to take on excessive risk. When 
deposits are insured, however, bank depositors lack incentives to monitor (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2004; Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). The lack of market discipline leads to 
excessive risk taking, culminating in banking crises. Anginer et al., (2013), Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002), and Barth et al. (2004) find 
evidence in support of this view. Nonetheless, there is the argument that regulation and 
supervision can control the moral hazard problem by designing an appropriate insurance 
scheme. Therefore, wHH[DPLQHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSRIGHSRVLWLQVXUDQFHZLWKEDQNV¶UHWXUQVDQG
risk. During a crisis we expect banks to benefit from the presence of deposit insurance 
schemes. The hypotheses are stated as follows: 
H5a: The presence of deposit insurance reduces bank risk during financial turmoil. 
H5b: The presence of deposit insurance increases EDQNV¶VWRFNUHWXUQV during 
financial turmoil. 
 
3. A narrative of the credit and sovereign debt crises 
Over the period 2000 to 2007, banking activities over the world experienced rapid 
growth leading to an expansion of their balance sheets and therefore to an increase in their 
risk appetite. For instance, banks increasingly via financial innovation expanded into foreign 
currency assets such as US dollar-denominated claims, and European banks in particular 
showed the largest growth in foreign claims. Even though the exposures to the respective 
foreign currency claims were hedged off-balance sheet, this still led to an increase in funding 
risk, in which European banks had substantial funding needs of $1.1 to $1.3 trillion USD by 
mid-2007 (McGuire and von Peter, 2009). Similarly, Acharya and Schnabl (2009) argue that 
the global imbalances do not offer a valid explanation as to why the financial crisis spread 
internationally. Rather, they argue, it is the fact that large commercial banks in both current 
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account surplus and deficit countries had large exposures to asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) conduits (valued at $1.2 trillion USD of short-term ABCP outstanding in June of 
2007) that caused the financial crisis to spread so rapidly in 2007. Acharya and Schnabl 
(2009) also argue that it was the lax regulation monitoring the financial services industry that 
contributed to the financial crisis of 2007.  
When the financial crisis started to unfold in 2007, this funding risk became more 
pronounced for banks, which had a significant impact in the markets such as FX and money 
markets. Moreover, European banks required the support of central banks in dealing with this 
associated risk until the end of September, 2008 (McGuire and von Peter, 2009). During 
2008±09, there was limited concern regarding European sovereign debt, but the shockwaves 
of the 2007 financial crisis triggered a reevaluation of asset prices, risk, and growth 
prospects, especially in countries with economic imbalances (Lane, 2012). As shown in 
Figure 1, there is a significant increase in the market valuations relative to GDP leading up to 
the financial crisis. Once the financial crisis starts unfolding in 2007, there is a significant 
decrease of market valuations relative to GDP. Accordingly, we use 2007±08 as the credit 
crisis period to measure risk and stock returns. In 2009 and 2010, the markets are recovering 
from the financial shock of 2007±08, when the sovereign debt crisis starts to take hold, 
leading to further reduction in market valuations across the board. We use 2011 to measure 
risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis. In 2012, though, there are signs of recovery, 
and in both crises, there is a significant decrease in market valuations, due to reevaluations of 
asset prices and factoring new potential risks (Lane, 2012), lasting more than a year and 
followed by a recovery. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Figures 2 and 3 show the evolution of total loans outstanding and the respective 
annual changes that were given by banking institutions (domestic and foreign) in a set of EU 
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countries and the US. The figures show that after 2004, the value of loans outstanding 
experiences a significant increase, reaching their peak in 2007 when the financial crisis 
erupts. Following the financial crisis, there is a small adjustment in the value of loans in 2008 
and 2009, which increases again in 2010when the sovereign debt crisis starts. In the two 
years that follow the sovereign debt crisis, there is a small downward readjustment in the 
value of loans. 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 here] 
After 2007, there is a constant growth in sovereign debt (Figure 4), resulting in a 
significant and abrupt rise in the yields of sovereign debt bonds in a number of countries in 
the European periphery. Following, there is a divergence for a number of European periphery 
countries in terms of sovereign bond yield spreads, starting in early 2010. Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2012) find a relationship between high current account deficits over 2005±08 and 
significant current account reversals and expenditures over 2008±10. Toward the end of 
2009, there is an increase in the number of countries reporting large deficit-to-GDP ratios 
(Lane, 2012). Hui and Chang (2011) show that CDS spreads rose significantly to almost 250 
bps in February 2010, which they surpass in the spring of the same year. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
4. Variables used and methodology  
4.1 Distance to default 
We use log z, as introduced by Laeven and Levine (2009), to capture default risk. 
Log z, which measures the distance from bankruptcy (Roy, 1952), is estimated as the average 
ROA plus the capital-to-asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of the ROA. A higher z-
score indicates lower bank risk. We use the natural logarithm of z-score in our regressions, 
because the distribution of z-score is highly skewed. 
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Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the impact of the capital stringency index on the 
distance to default depends critically on the ownership structure. In widely held banks, a 
marginal increase in capital stringency has little impact on bank distance to default, while 
stronger capital stringency boosts bank risk when the bank has a powerful owner. The 
evidence is consistent with the view that capital regulations increase the risk-taking 
incentives of owners (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Buser, Chen and Kane, 1981). In the 
absence of a powerful owner the stringency of capital regulations has little marginal influence 
on risk. Beltratti and Stultz (2012) assess the log of distance to default in the credit crisis and 
report that banks with higher ownership by the controlling shareholder have a lower distance 
to default. In addition, banks with a more shareholder-friendly board have a lower distance to 
default. Finally, the index of capital regulation has a positive coefficient, while the current 
account, the index of powers of the supervisors, the index of private monitoring, and the 
deposit insurance variable all have a negative coefficient. Our focus in this paper is to assess 
whether regulations are effective when a crisis hits the banking sector. We estimate the 
following equation with log z calculated during the credit and the sovereign debt crises. 
 
Log zi,j,crisis is log z for bank i, in country j during the credit and sovereign debt crises 
respectively. We calculate log z as the average ROA plus the capital-to-asset ratio divided by 
the standard deviation of ROA. For estimating log z during the credit crisis, we use the 
capital-to-assets ratio in 2008 and for ROA we use the average return on assets during 1998- 
2008 along with the standard deviation of ROA over the same period, as in Beltratti and Stutz 
(2012). For the sovereign debt crisis, the capital-to-assets ratio is taken at 2011 and for ROA 
we use the average return on assets during 2001-2011, along with the standard deviation of 
ROA over the same period. Officiali,j is a score that reflects the power of the commercial 
)1...(
PrRe
,,1,,,5
,4,3,2,1,,
tjitjiji
jijijijiCrisisji
controlsCountryandBankuranceDepositIns
ivatestrictCapitalOfficalzLog
HE
EEEED
:
 

18 
 
bank supervisory agency where bank
 
i is located in country j. Capitali,j is a score that reflects 
the regulatory oversight of bank capital for bank i in country j. Restrict i,j is a score that 
measures the regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks where bank
 
i is located in 
country j. Private monitoring i,j is a score that measures the degree of private monitoring 
where bank
  
i is located in country j. Deposit insurance
 i,j is a dummy variable equal to one 
where there is explicit deposit insurance (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2007). 
The explanatory regulation variables are retrieved from the World Bank3 as in Caprio 
et al. (2007, revised in June 2008), The banking regulations survey contains 312 questions on 
different dimensions, and most of the questions require yes/no types of answers. We form 
scores for measuring different dimensions, which are called official, capital, restrict, and 
private monitoring. All the bank-level and country-level controls are described in sections 4.6 
and 4.7, respectively. Finally, we estimate equation (1) with ordinary least squares (OLS). 
We ensure that multicollinearity is not present by checking the correlation matrix and by 
estimating the variance inflation factor (VIF) following the estimation of our models.4 
4.2 Marginal expected shortfall 
The recent financial crisis has led to a reevaluation of risk taking and regulation of the 
financial system, with a transformed interest in systemic fragility and macro prudential 
regulation. This needs an effort to understand not only the risk of individual financial 
LQVWLWXWLRQVEXWDQLQGLYLGXDOEDQN¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHULVNRI the financial system as a 
whole. Therefore, from a regulatory viewpoint, there is an increasing agreement that in 
safeguarding systemic stability, the link in the risk-taking behavior of banks is much more 
important than the absolute level of risk taking in any individual institution. As an alternative 
measure of bank-level risk, we FRPSXWHDPHDVXUHRIHDFKEDQN¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWR the system 
                                                          
3This data set is taken from  http://econ.worldbank.org/ 
4
 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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as a whole. Our measure of marginal expected shortfall is based on the expected capital 
shortfall framework, as in Acharya et al. (2012). 
The systemic expected shortfall of an institution refers to the capital deficiency a 
financial firm would face in case of a systemic event. It is based on the idea that a shortage of 
capital is hazardous for the individual firm but becomes risky for the whole economy if it 
happens just when the rest of the banking sector is also undercapitalized. This measure is 
intended to capture how much each firm adds to the risk of the banking system as a whole. 
The MES of a firm is the expected loss an equity investor in a financial firm would 
experience if the market declined substantially. Following Acharya et al. (2010), we use MES 
as our systemic risk measure. MES measures the average firm return on days when the 
market as a whole is in the tail of its loss distribution: 
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tR is the equity return of financial firm i, and
M
tR  is the market index return. A 
systemic event is defined as a drop of the market index below a threshold * , over a given 
time horizon. The systemic event is thus denoted by MtR <* .We estimate the MES by 
following Acharya et al. (2010) at a standard risk level of 5%, using daily data for equity 
returns retrieved from DataStream. This means that we take the 5% worst days for the market 
returns ( MtR ) during the credit and sovereign debt crises and then compute the average return 
on any given firm ( itR ) for these days. Our main focus in this paper is whether regulations are 
effective when a crisis hits the banking sector. We estimate the same equation using MES as 
left-hand side variable calculated during the credit crisis and the Sovereign Debt crisis. 
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MESi,j,crisis is  the marginal expected shortfall for bank i, in country j during the credit and 
sovereign debt crises respectively. We calculate MES, using equation 2 above, for the credit 
crisis IURP-XQHWR'HFHPEHUWRPHDVXUHEDQNV¶systemic risk, as in Fahlenbrach 
et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz, (2012). For the sovereign debt crisis, we calculate MES 
from May 2011 to December 2011 to measure EDQNV¶systemic risk during that period. In the 
robustness section, we use two alternative time period to calculate systemic risk during the 
sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we use the same explanatory variables and econometric 
procedure as in section 4.1. 
4.3 Idiosyncratic risk 
We analyze idiosyncratic risk as a measure of business/operational risk of banks as in 
Kane and Unal (1988) and Flannery and James (1984). Recently, after being hit by the 
financial crisis, there was a significant increase in interest in idiosyncratic risks of banks. For 
instance, Hoque (2013) reports a positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and bank 
capital during the credit crisis and a negative relationship during the sovereign debt crisis. 
Beltratti and Stultz (2012) find a negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and bank 
capital and a positive relationship between ownership and idiosyncratic risk. Anginer et al. 
(2013) show that deposit insurance is positively associated with risk taking in the pre-crisis 
period and negatively associated with risk taking in the crisis period.  Idiosyncratic is the 
idiosyncratic volatility, which is the annualized standard deviation from the market model 
regression residuals that estimate beta. We assess whether regulations are effective when a 
crisis hits the banking sector. We estimate the same equation twice using idiosyncratic risk as 
the left-hand side variable calculated for the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. 
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Idiosyncratic riski,j,crisis is  the annualized residual risk for bank i, in country j for the credit 
and sovereign debt crises respectively. For the credit crisis, we calculate idiosyncratic risk 
from the one-IDFWRUPDUNHWPRGHOUHJUHVVLRQUHVLGXDOVE\XVLQJEDQNV¶VWRFNUHWXUQVDQGWKH
MSCI World Index returns, as a proxy for the market portfolio, over June 2007 to December 
2008, as in Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For the sovereign debt 
crisis, we calculate the idiosyncratic risk from the one factor market model regression 
UHVLGXDOVE\XVLQJEDQNV¶VWRFNUHWXUQVDQGWKH06&,:RUOG,QGH[UHWXUQVDVDSUR[\IRUWKH
market portfolio, from May 2011 to December 2011. In the robustness section, we use two 
alternative time periods to calculate idiosyncratic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. 
Finally, we use the same explanatory variables and econometric procedure as in section 4.1 
4.4 Systematic risk 
We analyze systematic risk as a measure of banks¶ market risk, as in Kane and Unal 
(1988) and Flannery and James (1984). A higher sensitivity of bank share prices with market 
indices during both crises leads us to examine what factors drive market risk. Haq and 
Heaney (2012) analyze the systematic risk of banks in European countries and find that 
systematic risk is negatively related to bank capital, size, and charter value. Our systematic 
risk measure, Beta, is the beta coefficient estimated based on the one-factor model (CAPM) 
E\UHJUHVVLQJLQGLYLGXDOEDQNV¶VWRFNUHWXUQV against  the MSCI World Index returns. We 
analyze whether regulations affect systematic risk when a crisis hits the banking sector. We 
estimate the same equation twice, using Beta as the left-hand side variable calculated during 
the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. 
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Beta,i,j,crisis is  the measure of systematic risk for bank i, in country j for the credit and 
sovereign debt crises, respectively. For the credit crisis, we estimate beta by employing one-
factor market model regressions from June 2007 to December 2008, as in Fahlenbrach et al., 
(2012) and Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). For the sovereign debt crisis, we estimate beta by 
employing one-factor market model regressions over May 2011 to December 2011 . We use 
the MSCI World Index returns as the proxy for market returns. In the robustness section, we 
use two alternative time period for estimating beta during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, 
we use the same explanatory variables and econometric procedure as in section 4.1. 
4.5 Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR)  
6LQFHWKHODWH¶V, there has been a growing shift in the view of the importance of 
market variables on the risk assessment of banks and how these variables can enhance 
supervisory monitoring (Greenspan, 1998;Curry et al. 2001, 2003). Moreover, bank 
supervisors assess a bank¶VULVNWKURXJKWKHLUSURSULHWDU\LQIRUPDWLRQJDWKHUed at infrequent 
intervals. Berger et al. (2000) suggest that market data are not only informative but that they 
can also contain information not yet LQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRVXSHUYLVRUV¶ information, while market 
data do not fully reflect all the information that is available to supervisors. Since market 
variables contain information on firm risk reflected in the daily price changes, supervisory 
assessment can be complemented via the equity markets (Gunther et al., 2001; Hall et al., 
2001; Elmer and Fissel, 2001; Curry et al., 2001). Krainer et al. (2001, 2003) also show that 
FXPXODWLYHDEQRUPDOUHWXUQVDUHDEOHWRDQWLFLSDWHFKDQJHVWREDQNV¶risk captured by credit 
ratings. Moreover, the authors argXHWKDWHTXLW\PDUNHWYDULDEOHVDGGYDOXHWRUHJXODWRUV¶
assessment of banks and in a timely manner.  
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As in Krishnan et al. (2005), EDQNV¶VWRFNPDUNHWSHUIRUPDQFHFRQWDLQV
supplementary information regarding banks¶ risk, which is also reflected in a timely manner. 
Based on the learning hypothesis, banks that learn from a past bad experience will adjust their 
risk attitude (FahOHQEUDFKHWDO,QWXUQWKHVKLIWLQEDQNV¶ULVNDWWLWXGHVKRXOGEH
reflected in their stock performance. Therefore, as in Belttrati and Stulz (2012) and 
Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), ZHHVWLPDWHEDQNV¶EX\-and-hold abnormal returns to assess what 
drives their performance and whether supervision regulations and any capital measures affect 
EDQNV¶ULVNDVUHIOHFWHGin their stock price. 
To measure stock market performance, we calculate the BHAR following Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012), as follows: 
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Where 
crisisjiBHAR ,, is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for bank i in country j during 
a crisis period, Ri,j,crisis is the daily return of bank i in country j, and RM,j,crisis is the daily return 
on the market proxied by the MSCI World Index return. Then, we estimate the following 
equation twice, using BHAR as the left hand side variable calculated during the credit and 
sovereign debt crises. 
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:H FDOFXODWH %+$5 IURP -XQH  WR 'HFHPEHU  WR PHDVXUH EDQNV¶ VKDUH SULFH
performance. Even though the credit crisis did not officially end at the end of 2008, since it 
continued through the first few months in 2009, the fall in share prices at the beginning of 
2009 may have been partly due to bank rescues. Moreover, we use December 31, 2008, as a 
cut-off point to be consistent with Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). 
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We calculate the BHAR from May 2011 to December 2011 to measure EDQNV¶ share price 
performance during the sovereign debt crisis. In the robustness section, we use two 
alternative period definitions to calculate risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis. We 
use the same explanatory variables and econometric procedure as in section 4.1. 
4.6. Bank-level controls 
To understand the importance of bank capital during times of turmoil, we use Tier I 
capital, which is a measure of capital adequacy, following Laeven and Levine (2009), and 
which was more relevant during the crisis, according to Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2010). Tier 1 
capital is defined as shareholder funds plus perpetual noncumulative preference shares 
relative to risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks, measured under the Basel 
rules. This figure is expressed as a percentage and should be at least 4%. Banks with greater 
quality capital are more able to absorb losses during financial turmoil (Beltratti and Stultz, 
2012). Therefore, investors attach great LPSRUWDQFHWRDEDQN¶VFDSLWDOTXDOLW\, and we expect 
a positive relationship between bank capital and risk. 
To shed light on the impact of liability structures, we use deposits, defined as total 
deposits relative to total assets (Anginer et al., 2013). With explicit deposit insurance in 
place, deposit financing is not subject to runs. However, other money market-related funding 
is subject to runs (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Gorton, 2010) and dries up during crisis times. 
Therefore, we use funding fragility, introduced by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), 
defined as the ratio of deposits from other banks, other deposits, and short-term borrowing to 
total deposits plus money market and short-term funding. We expect banks with more 
deposits and less funding fragility to take more risk.  
To capture the asset side of the balance sheet, we use several measures. The major 
asset of any type of commercial, mortgage, and cooperative bank is loans. Loans include 
residential mortgage loans, other mortgage loans, other consumer or retail loans, corporate & 
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commercial loans, and other loans minus reserve against possible losses on impaired or 
nonperforming loans. Banks with more loans on their books are more likely to have relatively 
lower exposure to off-balance sheet securities (e.g., derivatives), and thus run a lower risk 
with the widening of the credit spreads during a crisis (Beltratti and Stultz, 2012). Therefore, 
banks with higher loans rather than risky securities should perform better, ceteris paribus. 
However, because we do not have the composition of loans as such, we do not have an 
expectation of the sign of loans. Following Laeven and Levine (2009), we use liquidity, 
defined as liquid assets scaled by total assets. As banks with more liquid assets are expected 
to perform better during a crisis, we expect a positive relationship between liquidity and stock 
performance. 
To capture the income statement exposure, we use income diversity. Banks that derive 
their income from diverse activities have less exposure during a crisis. We use income 
diversity, by following Laeven and Levine (2008), defined as the absolute value of difference 
between net interest income and other operating income divided by total operating income. 
4.7. Country-level governance and macroeconomic variables 
We include macroeconomic variables as additional controls. For instance, countries 
with a higher level of financial development and economic fundamentals might have different 
risk and returns. To control for country-level development, we use the gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita at 2006 constant terms, as in Anginer et al. (2013). To control for the 
financial position of the country, we use current account balance, as in Klomp and Haan 
(2012). Current acc. bal. is the current account balance divided by GDP. To control for level 
of market competition, we use concentration, as in Laeven and Levine (2009).Concentration 
is the total assets of the largest three banks in each country divided by total banking assets.  
Evidence shows that companies in countries with better country-level governance 
have better returns, DVVKDUHKROGHUV¶ULJKWVDUHEHWWHUSURWHFWHG-RKQHWDOADRI is La 
26 
 
3RUWDHWDO¶VDQWL-director index as revised by Djankov et al. (2008). A higher value 
means better protected shareholder rights. The variable institution is used, following Klomp 
and Haan (2012). It is the arithmetic average of six indicators called voice, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption that are reported in 
Kaufmann et al. (2008). A higher value for an institution means that better and more efficient 
supervisory institutions are present.  
 
5. Data and descriptive statistics  
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
We collected bank data from Bankscope. We searched for the largest 1,000 banks in 
Bankscope by asset size at the end of 2006. Included in the sample are commercial banks, 
savings banks, cooperative banks, and mortgage banks. When we selected the largest 1,000 
banks, Bankscope provided both listed and unlisted banks, with a total of 502 unlisted banks. 
Since we focused on listed-only banks, this reduced the number of banks to a significant 
extent. Moreover, as we assessed the impact of regulations on global banks in the credit and 
sovereign debt crisis, we employed those banks listed during the credit crisis and the 
sovereign debt crisis. In total, 120 banks were delisted following the credit crisis. In addition, 
as we required bank balance sheet and income statement data for 2006 and 2010, we 
excluded the delisted banks, as data was not available in Bankscope. Our final sample 
included 378 global banks. We retained 378 banks for which we had accounting and share 
price data. All the systematically important banks (29) are included in the sample.6 Finally, 
                                                          
6The list of Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions is very much as had been expected, with 17 European 
banks, eight US ones, three Japanese, and one Chinese: Bank of America,Bank of China,Bank of New York Mellon, Banque 
Populaire CE, Barclays,BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Dexia, Goldman Sachs, 
Crédit Agricole, HSBC, ING Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Lloyds Banking Group, Mitsubishi UFJ FG, Mizuho FG, Morgan 
Stanley, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Société Générale, State Street, Sumitomo Mitsui, UBS, Unicredit 
Group, and Wells Fargo. The FSB and the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision drew up a list of G-SIFIs based on five 
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we downloaded data on share prices and the MSCI World Index from DataStream; all data is 
in US dollars. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. The mean (median) distance to default is 
3.106 (2.965) during the credit crisis. The distance to default is higher during the credit crisis 
and significantly different than in the sovereign debt crisis. Our measure for systemic risk, 
MES, is lower during the credit crisis. The mean (median) difference test shows a significant 
difference between the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. Systematic risk, as 
measured by beta, was lower during the credit crisis as compared to the sovereign debt crisis. 
It seems to increase after the 2007±08 credit crisis. Idiosyncratic volatility shows a similar 
picture, as it is higher before the 2011 crisis. The 2007±08 credit crisis contributed to the 
systematic and idiosyncratic volatility. The mean (median) BHAR2007±08 during the credit 
crisis is ±0.502 (±0.571), which shows that banks perform poorly. BHAR2011 is also 
negative and shows that banks perform badly during the sovereign debt crisis as well. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
All the accounting variables are calculated before the crisis. Tangible equity does not 
show any significant difference between these two periods. Average Tier I capital shows that 
banks increase regulatory capital significantly before the 2011 crisis period, in order to 
gradually comply with the new capital requirements introduced in Basel III. Liquid assets are 
significantly higher before the 2007±08 crisis than in 2011. There is no significant difference 
in the deposit ratios of the banks during those periods. Funding fragility is higher before the 
credit crisis compared to the sovereign debt crisis. The results give an early indication that in 
the aftermath of the 2007±08 credit crisis, banks strive to strengthen their positions by 
reducing their funding fragility. The loan to total asset ratio is slightly higher before 2011. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
criteria: their absolute size, their complexity, the extent of their cross-border activity, and the degree to which they are 
interconnected with the rest of the financial system.  
 
28 
 
Even though the per-capita GDP is the same during both crisis periods, the current account 
balance as a percentage of GDP deteriorates during the sovereign debt crisis.  
All the regulations variables show a good degree of variability. The 5thpercentile for 
official supervisory power is 7, and the 95th percentile is 13. Capital restrictions are bounded 
between 4 and 8. The country-level variables show a wide variety of regulation levels. For 
instance, concentration shows a minimum of 0.32 and a maximum of 0.85. Eighty-four 
percent of our sample banks have explicit deposit insurance. In sum, there is a lot of variation 
in the regulation levels, which makes it possible to test our conjectures.  
5.2. Cross-country variations 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the risk and return characteristics of 
banks across countries. In particular, we report cross-country variations for countries that 
have at least five banks in the sample. Banks in Poland have the highest distance to default 
(log z) measure during the credit crisis, but this changes during the sovereign debt crisis, as 
banks in Poland become more vulnerable to sovereign debt exposure and uncertainty. We 
find that Chilean banks have the highest systemic risk, as the MES is the lowest for these two 
countries during both the credit and sovereign debt crises. Banks in Austria have the lowest 
idiosyncratic risk in both the credit (18.41) and the sovereign debt (27.34) crises. In contrast, 
banks in Indonesia have the highest idiosyncratic risk during both crisis periods. With regard 
to beta, banks in Switzerland and the US have the highest beta values for both crisis periods 
(beta2007:1.48, beta2011:1.67  for Switzerland and beta2007:1.45, beta 2011:1.78 for the 
US, respectively).Moreover, the  banks based in Japan have the lowest beta during the credit 
crisis (0.67), and this remains low during the sovereign debt crisis (0.86).The lowest BHAR 
is reported for Greece during both the credit (-0.759) and the sovereign debt (-0.902) crises. 
Banks in Japan perform relatively better during both crisis periods (BHAR is ±0.230 in 2007±
08 and 0.003 in 2011).  
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Impact of regulations on risk and return during the credit crisis 
This section presents the results on bank risk and returns during the credit crisis. In 
particular, we assess the impact of a number of regulations, while controlling for bank-
specific characteristics, on four measurements of bank risk and the buy-and-hold returns 
during the credit crisis.  
6.1.1. Distance to default  
We first examine whether the regulations have any impact on the distance to default, 
as introduced by Laeven and Levine (2009). Table 4, columns (1)±(2) report the regression 
results, with distance to default (log z) as the dependent variable. The results for the credit 
crisis show that restriction, private monitoring, and deposit insurance are negatively and 
significantly related to the distance to default. These results imply that the restrictions 
imposed on bank activities do not increase the soundness of the banks when a crisis breaks 
out. Due to moral hazard issues, banks may engage in risky activities if they are allowed to 
conduct any activities (Boyd et al., 1993). However, we find that restricting bank activities is 
negatively associated with bank soundness, consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Beltratti 
and Stultz (2012). According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), deposit insurance 
could influence bank soundness in two opposite ways. Firstly, if deposit insurance is in place, 
it increases bank soundness by reducing the chances of bank runs. In contrast, banks may 
engage in excessive risk-taking behavior. Our results here highlight the second view. In the 
presence of deposit insurance, banks are less sound amidst financial turmoil. Our results are 
consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who show 
that the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme tends to increase the probability of 
banking crises.  
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
In column (2), we include buy-and-hold returns before the credit crisis, Tier 1 capital, 
funding fragility, loans, income diversity, log of assets, GDP per capita, current account 
balance, and concentration of banking sector. We find that our main results in terms of 
regulations survive after controlling for other variables. We include BHAR to test whether 
the market provides any information on bank soundness, but we find no such evidence. We 
include Tier 1 capital to test whether better capitalized banks are sounder, and we find it is 
strongly and positively related to bank soundness. However, this is in contrast to Beltratti and 
Stultz (2012). We find that size is negatively related to distance to default, which implies that 
larger banks are less safe. Finally, concentration is significantly positively related to bank 
soundness.  
6.1.2. Systemic risk 
From a regulatory viewpoint, there is increasing consensus that the correlation in the 
risk-taking behavior of banks is much more relevant than the absolute level of risk taking in 
any individual institution. The financial crisis of 2007±08 highlighted the importance of 
systemic risk leading regulators to focus more on preventing future financial crises from 
spreading through the financial system, e.g., the ongoing work by the Basel Committee and 
the Financial Stability Board, striving to set new regulatory requirements for Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFI). Acharya (2009) suggests that if sovereign states or 
central banks provide an implicit guarantee to cover losses stemming from a systemic crisis, 
banks will have more incentives to take on correlated risks. Guaranteed banks will not have 
any incentives to diversify their operations, as they are protected by the guarantees. 
According to Anginer et al. (2013), deposit insurance not only increases bank-level risk 
taking through the standard moral hazard channel, but it may also increase risk-taking on the 
whole as well. The use of individual banks¶ contribution to systemic risk measure is 
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relatively new and allows us to test the effects of regulations during the credit crisis and 
sovereign debt crisis. Most of the earlier empirical work has examined the relationship 
between regulation and systemic stability by using the incidence of banking crisis at the 
country level as a measure of systemic risk (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).  
In this section, we examine the relationship between regulations and bank-level 
systemic risk during the credit crisis. The regression specifications and control variables are 
the same as those used in Section 6.1.1. We use marginal expected shortfall as the dependent 
variable to measure bankV¶systemic risk, as described in Section 4. The results are in 
columns (3)±(4) in Table 3. The results show that capital regulation and activity restrictions 
are positively related to systemic risk during the credit crisis. This suggests that better 
oversight of capital is related to higher MES, which means lower systemic risk, consistent 
with Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), who report that stringent capital requirements reduce 
banking risk. Moreover, higher activity restrictions reduce individual banks¶ contribution 
towards systemic risk. The results also show that deposit insurance is negatively related to 
MES, implying that in the presence of deposit insurance, banks take more risk, which 
increases the chance of bank runs. These results are consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who find that explicit deposit insurance increases 
the probability of banking crises. When we introduce bank- and country-level control 
variables (column (4), Table 3) most of the results related to regulations survive. None of the 
control variables is significant. In this specification, private monitoring is positively related to 
MES, implying that higher private monitoring leads to higher MES. In other words, higher 
SULYDWHPRQLWRULQJUHGXFHVLQGLYLGXDOEDQNV¶FRQWULEXWLRQWRZDUGVV\VWHPLFULVN 
6.1.3. Idiosyncratic risk 
Next we examine the impact of regulations on idiosyncratic volatility. The regression 
specifications and control variables are the same as those used in Section 6.1.1, and we use 
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idiosyncratic volatility as the dependent variable to measure bankV¶ business risk, as 
described in Section 4. The results are in columns (5)±(6) in Table 3. The results in column 
(5), i.e., without bank- and country-level controls, show that official power and deposit 
insurance is positively and capital and restrictions are negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. 
The results show that higher capital restrictions lower the idiosyncratic risk, which is 
consistent with Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005). In the presence of deposit insurance, banks 
take more risks, as deposit insurance is positively related to idiosyncratic risk, consistent with 
Beltratti and Stultz (2012) and Anginer et al. (2013). Our results support the moral hazard 
channel of risk taking in the presence of deposit insurance.  
We then introduce the bank- and country-level control variables in column (6). The 
results with respect to the regulations are mostly the same, with the exception that restriction 
is no longer significant. We include BHAR before the crisis and find that it is positive and 
significant. This suggests that banks with high returns before the crisis have higher risk 
during the crisis. The market imposes some discipline in terms of returns, which leads banks 
to take more risk. Moreover, the higher the funding fragility the lower the risk, as before the 
credit crisis, the short-term funding market is working well. Finally, larger banks take more 
risks as the log of assets is positively related to idiosyncratic risk. 
6.1.4. Systematic risk  
In this section, we examine the impact of regulations on EDQNV¶V\VWHPDWLFULVN
7KHUHIRUHZHXVHEDQNV¶EHWDDVWKHGHSHQGHQWYDUiable, as described in Section 4, along with 
the same regression specifications and control variables as those in Section 6.1.1. The results 
are in columns (7)±(8) in Table 3. The results in column (7), excluding bank- and country-
level variables, show that official supervision is positively UHODWHGWREDQNV¶PDUNHWULVN7KLV
is puzzling, as one would expect higher official supervision to prevent banks from taking 
excessive risks, hence resulting in lower market risk. In contrast, and as expected, we find 
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that capital restrictions and private monitoring are negatively related to market risk. This 
finding, which is consistent with Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), suggests that more 
stringent capital regulations and private monitoring prevent banks from taking excessive risk, 
resulting in their increased ability to absorb losses and be less sensitive to systematic risk. 
0RUHRYHUZHGRQRWILQGDQ\HYLGHQFHWKDWGHSRVLWLQVXUDQFHDIIHFWVEDQNV¶V\VWHPDWLFULVN 
We then introduce the bank- and country-level controls, and our results on the impact 
of regulations remain the same. We also introduce BHAR to test whether there is any 
feedback through the market returns on beta, and we find that BHAR is highly significant and 
positive. This suggests that banks with high BHAR before the credit crisis are more sensitive 
to systematic risk during the crisis. In addition, we find that larger banks have higher beta, 
which shows the systemic importance of large banks in their respective stock markets. 
Finally, GDP per capita is positively related while current account balance is negatively 
related to beta. 
6.1.5. Buy-and-hold-returns  
In this section, we assess the drivers of banks¶ stock market performance during the 
two crises. The results on the stock market performance during the credit crisis, reported in 
Table 4, show that official supervision is consistently positive and highly significant. This 
suggests that the markets show greater confidence in the banking sector in countries with 
better and more effective official monitoring and that banks in these countries are more 
resilient during the credit crisis. This is also supported by the fact that regulatory restrictions 
are positive and significant, suggesting that in countries with stricter regulations, banks have 
a better stock market performance. This suggests that better official monitoring helps keep 
bankV¶ ultimate owners¶LQWHUHVWVDOLJQHGZLWKWKRVHRIVKDUHKROGHUV, resulting in a better 
stock performance during the crisis.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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The results on private monitoring are positive and significant. Based on the argument 
of Belttrati and Stulz (2012), that better governance has a positive effect on bank stock 
performance, our results on private monitoring suggest that better external monitoring leads 
to better bank governance. This, in turn, leads to better stock performance. We find that 
capital requirements have no impact on the market valuation and pricing of bank risk. We 
also find some evidence, though not as strong, that banks with higher Tier 1 capital perform 
better, consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012). The results also show that banks in 
countries with deposit insurance perform better. Further, we find that banks with greater 
idiosyncratic volatility and systematic risk show a poor performance during the credit crisis, 
consistent with Acharya et al. (2010) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who find a negative 
relationship between beta and returns during the credit crisis. We find no evidence of funding 
fragility, liquidity, or UDWLRRIGHSRVLWVKDYLQJDQLPSDFWRQEDQNV¶VWRFNSHUIRUPDQFH:HGR
find, though, that banks with a lower ratio of loans over assets operating in countries with 
slowing economies have a poor stock performance during the credit crisis. We also find some 
evidence that banks in countries with higher current account balances have better stock 
performance, consistent with Lane (2012), who argues that the 2007 financial shock caused a 
reevaluation of asset prices, especially in countries with greater economic imbalances. 
 
6.2. Impact of regulations on risk and return during the sovereign debt crisis 
In this section we repeat the regressions on the same risk variables and the buy-and-
hold returns during the sovereign debt crisis. The objective here is to assess whether banks 
take more sensible risks in the aftermath of the credit crisis, and whether the regulations 
GXULQJWKHVRYHUHLJQGHEWFULVLVDIIHFWEDQNV¶ULVNDQGUHWXUQVWKH same way as in the credit 
crisis. 
6.2.1. Distance to default  
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We examine whether regulations have any impact on the distance to default during 
the sovereign debt crisis, as in the credit crisis. This is particularly important, as after the 
credit crisis, a large number of banks went bankrupt. Table 5, in columns (1)±(2), reports the 
regression results for log z. In column (1), we only use the regulations variables. The results 
for the sovereign debt crisis show that as in the credit crisis, private monitoring is negatively 
and significantly related to the distance to default. Unlike the credit crisis, however, official 
supervision is negatively related to the distance to default. Deposit insurance is not significant 
in this regression. Our results for the sovereign debt crisis do not provide conclusive evidence 
for deposit insurance. We do not find support for Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002), who show that an explicit deposit insurance scheme tends to increase the 
probability of banking crises, as banks become less sound in the presence of a deposit 
insurance scheme.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In column (2), we include the bank- and country-level control variables. We find that 
restriction is negatively related to log z, implying that the restrictions imposed on bank 
activities do not increase their soundness when a crisis breaks out. Due to moral hazard 
issues, banks may engage in risky activities if they are allowed to take any activities (Boyd et 
al., 1993). In contrast, we find that restricting bank activities is negatively associated with 
bank soundness, which is consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and Beltratti and Stultz (2012). 
We also include BHAR to test whether there is any market feedback on bank soundness in 
terms of returns. We find that BHAR is highly significant, suggesting that the market 
SURYLGHVIHHGEDFNUHJDUGLQJEDQNV¶VRXQGQHVV after the credit crisis and before the sovereign 
debt crisis. This implies that market participants become more vigilant to provide feedback 
once a crisis breaks out. We include Tier 1 capital to test whether better capitalized banks are 
sounder and find that Tier 1 capital is strongly and positively related to bank soundness, 
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which is similar to the findings on the credit crisis. We do not find evidence of size being 
significantly related to the distance to default. Moreover, we find that GDP per capita is 
negatively related to distance to default, which shows that banks based in countries with 
higher GDP are more susceptible to risk. This is also consistent with the fact that the 
sovereign debt crisis essentially originates from European countries.  
6.2.2. Systemic risk  
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, systemic risk became more important, as 
regulators¶ objectives were to prevent another crisis. However, since after the credit crisis, 
sovereign states were drawn into the sovereign debt crisis via bank rescues, examining the 
correlated risk taking in the sovereign debt crisis can extend our understanding of the extent 
to which state or central bank guarantees can shake the base of the sovereigns. Acharya 
(2009) argues that banks are more likely to take on more correlated risks when there is an 
implicit state or central bank guarantee to cover losses stemming from a systemic crisis.  
In this section, we examine the relationship between regulations and individual bank 
systemic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. The regression specifications and control 
variables are the same as those used in Section 6.1.2. As a dependent variable, we use 
marginal expected shortfall (MES), as described in Section 4, to proxy for the systemic risk. 
The results in Table 5, columns (3)±(4), show that capital regulation and activity restrictions 
are positively related, while deposit insurance is negatively related to systemic risk during the 
sovereign debt crisis, as they are during the credit crisis. This implies that better oversight of 
capital is related to lower systemic risk, as denoted by higher MES. Restricting banks¶ 
activity reduces individual banks¶ contribution toward systemic risk. In addition, deposit 
insurance is negatively related to MES, implying that in the presence of deposit insurance, 
banks take more risk. Consequently, this increases the likelihood of bank runs. Using 
previous banking crisis data, Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) 
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find that explicit deposit insurance increases the probability of banking crises. When we 
introduce bank- and country-level controls (Table 5, column (4)), most of the results related 
to regulations survive. None of the additional control variables are significant except ADRI. 
This suggests that in countries with better protected shareholder rights, banks experience less 
systemic risk. 
6.2.3. Idiosyncratic risk  
In this section, we assess the drivers of idiosyncratic risk during the sovereign debt 
crisis. The dependent variable is idiosyncratic volatility, and we use the same regression 
specifications and control variables as those used in Section 6.1.2. The results are shown in 
Table 5, columns (5)±(6). The results in column (5), excluding bank- and country-level 
control variables, show that higher capital restrictions lead to lower idiosyncratic risk, 
consistent with Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005). Moreover, we find that in the presence of 
deposit insurance, banks take more risk, even following the credit crisis, as deposit insurance 
is positively related to idiosyncratic risk during the sovereign debt crisis. As in the credit 
crisis, our results support the argument that the presence of deposit insurance increases moral 
hazard during the sovereign debt crisis. This is also consistent with Beltratti and Stultz (2012) 
and Anginer et al. (2013). 
In column (6), we include the bank- and country-level control variables. Our previous 
results regarding the impact of regulation remain mostly the same. The only exception is 
regulatory restriction, which is no longer significant. Moreover, the results show that a higher 
level of private monitoring leads to higher idiosyncratic risk. This suggests that even though 
investors monitor banks, they still entice banks to take more risks in the pursuit for higher 
returns. In addition, we find that the BHAR before the sovereign debt crisis is positive and 
significant. This suggests that banks delivering higher returns prior to the sovereign debt 
crisis end up being more exposed to idiosyncratic risk. We also find that having higher Tier 1 
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capital reduces idiosyncratic risk. This shows that one of UHJXODWRUV¶ways of making banks 
more resilient and able to absorb greater losses is successful, as suggested by the lower 
idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, the results show that banks with more diverse income have 
lower risk during the sovereign debt crisis. However, we find that unlike the credit crisis, 
funding fragility and size are not significant. We also find that current account balance is 
negative and significant, suggesting that countries that are more financially sound have 
greater flexibility to intervene and prevent a bank from becoming insolvent, as opposed to 
financially fragile states. Finally, we find that shareholder protection, captured by ADRI, is 
negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. 
6.2.4. Systematic risk  
In this section, ZHDVVHVVWKHLPSDFWRIUHJXODWLRQVRQEDQNV¶PDUNHWULVN during the 
sovereign debt crisis:HXVHEDQNV¶EHWD, discussed in section 4, as the dependent variable, 
and we employ the same regression specifications and variables as in section 6.1.2. The 
results are reported in Table 5, columns (7)±(8). The results (column (7)) show that official 
supervision is positively and capital and private monitoring are negatively related to market 
risk. This suggests that stringent capital regulations reduce systematic risk, consistent with 
Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005). In addition, the results show that higher private monitoring 
leads to lower systematic risk, which is consistent with the view that private monitoring 
reduces the systematic risk of banks. However, we find no evidence of deposit insurance 
having an impact on EDQNV¶systematic risk during the sovereign debt crisis, similar to our 
findings on the credit crisis. 
In column (7), we introduce the bank- and country-level controls. We find that the 
higher DEDQN¶VBHAR is before the sovereign debt crisis, the higher its systematic risk is 
when the sovereign debt crisis unfolds. While private monitoring leads banks to take on 
greater risk, at the same time, investors require more returns. In addition, larger banks have 
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higher beta, which shows the systemic importance of large banks in their respective stock 
markets. GDP per capita is positively and current account balance is negatively related to 
beta. Finally, higher levels of shareholder protection lead to lower systematic risk.  
6.2.5. Buy-and-hold-returns  
WHDVVHVVWKHGULYHUVRIEDQNV¶VWRFNPDUNHWSHUIRUPDQFHGXULQJWKHsovereign debt 
FULVLVLQRUGHUWRHYDOXDWHZKHWKHUWKHUHLVDVKLIWLQWKHIDFWRUVWKDWDIIHFWEDQNV¶VWRFNPDUNHW
performance during the credit crisis. The results reported in Table 6 show that the impact of 
capital requirements is still not significant, while official and private monitoring remain 
positive and significant during the sovereign debt crisis, as in the credit crisis. However, 
UHJXODWRU\UHVWULFWLRQVFHDVHWRLQIOXHQFHEDQNV¶VWRFNSHUIRUPDQFH, while deposit insurance 
schemes are negative and significant during the sovereign debt crisis, as opposed to the credit 
crisis. This suggests that in the presence of deposit insurance, banks take more risk and 
perform worse. Moreover, the adoption of higher Tier 1 capital levels that were introduced 
during the credit crisis becomes positive and significant. This is contrary to Acharya and 
Schnabl (2009), ZKRILQGDQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQEDQNV¶FDSLWDODQGVWRFNUHWXUQV
during August, 2007, but is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who find a robust, 
positive relationship between Tier 1 capital and bank performance. This suggests that banks 
with stronger balance sheets show a stronger stock performance. Idiosyncratic risk remains 
negative and significant, though beta has no impact during the sovereign debt crisis. This is 
consistent with Beltratti and Stultz (2012), who find a negative relatLRQVKLSEHWZHHQEDQNV¶
beta and their stock performance.  
Unlike the credit crisis, during the sovereign debt crisis, banks that are more 
financially robust in terms of funding fragility and overall deposits have a stronger stock 
performance, consistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012), 
while liquidity and bank loans have no impact during this period. The results on current 
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account balance and concentration remain the same for the credit and sovereign debt crisis. 
This suggests that greater country stability and less uncertainty about future growth prospects 
have a significant impact on bank performance during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we 
find that in countries with strong institutional and regulatory frameworks and better corporate 
governance, captured by ADRI and institution, banks show a stronger stock performance. 
This supports the argument that better governance leads to better stock performance (Beltratti 
and Stulz, 2012).  
7. Robustness checks 
Following Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we calculate the BHAR from June 2007 to 
December 2008 to measure the risk and return for the credit crisis. For the sovereign debt 
crisis, we measure the risk and the BHAR starting from May 2011 until the end of 2011 
(BHAR=±28.34). We use May 2011 as the starting point, because in May 2011, the Eurozone 
and the International Monetary Fund ,0)DSSURYHGD¼ELOOLRQEDLORXWIRU3RUWXJDO. For 
robustness checks, we use two alternative definitions, the beginning of 2010 until the end of 
2011 (BHAR=±25.89) and May 2010 to December 2011 (BHAR=±23.61).7To examine the 
robustness of our results, we run the regressions using alternative measures of risks and 
BHARs, i.e., the period from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2011 and the period from 
May 2010 to the end of 2011.  
The results on risk regressions are presented in Table 7. The results regarding MES 
show that irrespective of time periods, restriction is positively and private monitoring and 
deposit insurance are negatively related to MES. When we analyze idiosyncratic risk, we find 
that higher capital restrictions and private monitoring lower the idiosyncratic risk. The market 
                                                          
7We choose the beginning of 2010 as the starting point, as concern starts to build about all the heavily indebted 
countries in Europe²Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. Alternatively, we use May 2010 as a starting point, 
as on May 2, 2010 WKH(XUR]RQHPHPEHUVDQGWKH,0)DJUHHRQD¼ELOOLRQ bailout package to rescue 
Greece. 
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risk regressions show that the higher the official power, the lower the beta. In the presence of 
deposit insurance, a higher beta is observed. BHAR is significant in idiosyncratic risk and 
beta regressions. Likewise, Tier I capital is significant in idiosyncratic and beta regressions. 
We also find that the higher the size, the lower the idiosyncratic and market risk. Overall, the 
results found in Table 7 are similar to previous results. 
The official power of the regulators is significant in all the regressions, implying that 
banks perform better in countries with higher official power. Deposit insurance is negative 
and significant, suggesting that banks in the presence of deposit insurance take more risk and 
perform badly during the sovereign debt crisis. The effect of private monitoring on stock 
performance is positive and significant only for the BHAR of May 2010 to Dec 2011. We 
argue that this is probably due to the fact that the concerns regarding the servicing of 
sovereign debt in the European periphery are gathering momentum in February 2010, 
initiating a new cycle of uncertainty in the markets with the announcement of the first bailout 
package for Greece in early May, 2010, commanding greater scrutiny and monitoring of 
banks and their exposure to sovereign debt. 
Overall, the results shown in Table 8 are similar to our previous results and 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKHIDFWRUVWKDWDIIHFWEDQNV¶VWRFNSHUIRUPDQFHGXULQJWKH
sovereign debt crisis. For instance, the results on ADRI and institution remain positive and 
significant. Consistent with the argument of Beltratti and Stulz (2012),that a better alignment 
RIEDQNLQVLGHUV¶DQGVKDUHKROGHUV¶interests results in better performance, our results show 
that better investor monitoring leads to better corporate governance, resulting to better stock 
performance. Moreover, the results on Tier 1 capital and deposits remain positive and 
significant, and funding fragility remains negative, suggesting that banks with greater 
reliance on deposit and more robust funding show a better stock performance during the 
sovereign debt crisis. This is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
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(2011), and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012). The results on bank and country risk show that banks 
with higher idiosyncratic risk, which are based in more fragile countries²captured by GDP 
per cap²have worse stock performance.  
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 here] 
Finally, since our sample contains only 378 banks, it is important to check whether 
outliers are driving our results. We perform median regressions where the sum of the absolute 
weighted deviations is minimized. The results are qualitatively the same, as reported by using 
the ordinary least squares. We conclude that our results are not driven by outliers. We do not 
present these results, for brevity, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
8. Conclusion 
The financial crisis that originated in the securitized debt market spread rapidly, affecting all 
financial institutions to a certain degree, leading to numerous bank rescues and bankruptcies 
across countries. What is more, according to some commentators, this ignited the sovereign 
debt crisis. Even though our goal is not the identification of the reasons leading to the 
financial and sovereign debt crises, the poor bank performance in terms of risk and stock 
returns during both crises can be a good testing ground for regulation effectiveness. Hence, 
we shed light on the impact of regulations and regulatory and institutional frameworks.  
In particular, we analyze whether regulations are effective for bank risk and returns 
across the world during the credit and sovereign debt crisis periods. The results show that 
greater official supervision leads to higher systematic risk in banks during both crises. 
Moreover, official supervision leads to banks being riskier, captured by distance to default, 
but only during the sovereign debt crisis. We also find evidence that greater capital leads to 
lower bank risk during both crises, suggesting that banks having enough capital can insulate 
themselves from financial turmoil. Regarding regulatory restriction, we find that it has no 
impact on insulating banks during both crises. But we find that restriction leads to better 
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stock performance, but only during the credit crisis. Moreover, we find that having a deposit 
insurance scheme in place increases moral hazard and induces banks to take greater risks, 
resulting in greater exposure during both crises. Additionally, we find that greater private 
monitoring leads to lower bank risk. This suggests that investors actively monitoring banks 
prevent them from taking excessive risks. Hence, countries with higher private monitoring 
show a better stock performance during both crises.  
Our results have several policy implications regarding the effectiveness and design of 
regulations to better control risk and thus enhance the performance of global banks which are 
the focal point of regulators. More restrictions on banks increase the stability of global banks 
and reduce the systemic risk and idiosyncratic risk during the credit crisis. Moreover, 
restrictions on bank activities seem to be effective for controlling the stability of banks during 
times of turmoil. However, Barth et al. (2013) show that restrictions reduce efficiency. 
Hence, policymakers should strive to find the right balance of restrictions for reducing 
systemic risk without decreasing efficiency. In line with Anginer et al. (2013) we find that 
deposit insurance is negatively related to bank stability and systemic risk, suggesting that 
deposit insurance increases moral hazard. This is also consistent with Hovakimian et al. 
(2003) and Laeven (2002) who show that under weak institutional environments deposit 
insurance may work detrimentally. Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) also show that a 
FRXQWU\¶V private and public contracting environment is important in deposit-insurance 
adoption and design .Our findings raise the question: should policy makers rethink the design 
of deposit insurance as it increases the instability and systemic risk of individual banks?  
In terms of returns, banks in countries with greater official power, restrictions and 
private monitoring performed better during the credit crisis. These results suggest that while 
regulatory restrictions and supervision are necessary, at the same time it is important to have 
better private monitoring. Hence private monitoring, which is a market mechanism to reward 
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better banks, complements regulatory supervision. Our findings also highlight the need for 
regulators to access market information in regular intervals to supplement other sources of 
regulatory information. While official power of supervisors and private monitoring still 
explain the stock return performance of banks during the sovereign debt crisis, imposing 
greater restrictions on bank activities does not enhance bank returns. Policymakers need to 
bear this in mind especially when planning to impose more restrictions on banks while the 
banking system is still fragile. The results reported in this paper are consistent with the World 
Bank regulations IV in Barth et al. (2013) who find that some countries have eased the 
restrictions following the global financial crisis. 
Moreover, the evidence show that higher official power increases risk-taking during 
the credit crisis. This is consistent with the rent seeking view of supervisors as they use 
power to benefit favored voters, attract donations, and extract bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1998; Djankov et al., 2002; and Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). Beck et al. (2006) point out that 
if bank supervisory agencies have the authority to discipline noncompliant banks, the 
supervisors might use this power to induce or force banks to allocate credit so as to generate 
private or political benefits. Our findings raise some concerns regarding the optimal 
supervisory power of bank regulators.  
Most of the regulations were effective in controlling risk, apart from deposit insurance 
which has a detrimental effect on risk. Official power and private monitoring explains the 
returns during both the crises. Overall, our results can be extended to having policy 
implications: regulatory restrictions and supervision may be costly and difficult to enforce, 
EXWFRPELQHGZLWKWKHPDUNHW¶VVFUXWLQ\ they reduce the systemic risk, insulate banks from 
financial distress, and enable banks to provide a stronger stock performance during a crisis. 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions   
Variables Definitions Reasons for Inclusion 
Log z Average ROA plus capital to asset ratio, divided 
by the standard deviation of ROA. 
To capture the riskiness of the bank (Laeven and 
Levine, 2008). 
MES Average return on sample banks conditioned on 
5% worse returns on the market. 
To measure the systemic risk of banks (Acharya et al., 
2010). 
Idiosyncratic Annualized standard deviation from regressing 
weekly stock returns of individual stocks against 
the MSCI World Index. 
To capture the riskiness of the bank (Acharya et al., 
2010). 
Beta Coefficient from regressing weekly stock returns 
of individual stocks against the MSCI World 
Index. 
To capture the riskiness of the bank (Acharya et al., 
2010). 
BHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal return for individual 
banks. 
To measure the stock market performance (Beltratti 
and Stultz, 2012). 
Official A score that reflects the power of the commercial 
bank supervisory agency. 
To explain whether supervisory power can explain 
banks¶ risk and returns during a crisis (Caprio, Laeven 
and Levine,2007). 
Capital A score that reflects the regulatory oversight of 
bank capital. 
To assess whether regulatory oversight of bank capital 
can explain banks¶ risk and returns during a crisis 
(Caprio, Laeven and Levine,2007). 
Restrictions A score that measures the regulatory restrictions on 
the activities of banks. 
To measure the relationship between level of 
restrictions and bank risk and returns during a crisis 
(Caprio, Laeven and Levine, 2007). 
Private 
monitoring 
A score that measures the degree of private 
monitoring. 
To analyze whether private monitoring can discipline 
bank risk taking and hence returns (Caprio, Laeven and 
Levine, 2007). 
Deposit 
insurance 
A binary variable equal to one where there is 
explicit deposit insurance and zero otherwise.  
To better understand the role of deposit insurance in 
turmoil times (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven, 
2007). 
Tier I capital Shareholder funds plus perpetual non-cumulative 
preference shares as a percentage of risk-weighted 
assets and off-balance sheet risks measured under 
the Basel rules.  
To capture the importance of bank capital in times of 
turmoil (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche, 
2010). 
Deposits Total deposits as a fraction of total assets. To assess the impact of liability structures (Fahlenbrach 
et al., 2012). 
Funding 
fragility 
Ratio of deposits from other banks, other deposits, 
and short-term borrowing to total deposits, plus 
money market and short-term funding. 
To assess the impact of liability structures (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). 
Loans Total loans divided by total assets. To capture the asset side of the balance sheet 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche, 2010). 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets To control for bank size. 
Income diversity Absolute value of the difference between net 
interest income and other operating income 
divided by total operating income. 
To assess income diversity and how vulnerable a bank 
is during a crisis (Laeven and Levine,2009). 
GDP GDP per capita at 2006 constant terms. Beltratti and Stultz (2012). 
Current acc. 
bal. 
Current account balance scaled by GDP. Beltratti and Stultz (2012). 
Concentration The total assets of the largest three banks divided 
by total bank assets. 
To control for competition (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2010). 
Institution Arithmetic average of six indicators: voice, 
political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption. 
To control for country-level effects (Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi, 2008). 
ADRI The revised anti-director index of La Porta et al. 
(1998). 
To control for regulatory and institutional frameworks 
in each country (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer, 2008). 
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Figure 1: Market Capitalization to GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Total Bank Loans Outstanding 
 
Source: Bankscope 
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Figure 3: Logarithmic Changes in Total Loans Outstanding 
 
Source: Bankscope 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Public Debt to GDP 
 
 
Source: IMF Public Database, Eurostat, World Bank, OECD. 
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Table 1.Descriptive statistics. 
  N Mean Median p5 p95 
  The 2007±08 credit crisis  
Log z 311 3.106 2.965*** 1.836 4.315 
MES 378 ±0.075*** ±0.074*** ±0.099 ±0.050 
Beta  326 1.006* 1.012 0.317 1.693 
Idiosyncratic 378 42.335*** 37.669*** 19.108 79.695 
BHAR 346 ±0.502  ±0.571 ±0.894 0.022 
Tier I capital  295 9.739*** 8.850*** 5.840 16.530 
Liquidity  342 17.268*** 14.030** 2.910 42.180 
Deposit  342 61.254 67.476 16.565 90.393 
Funding fragility 342 21.259** 11.826** 0.952 73.279 
Loan 342 59.094* 59.826*** 32.501 82.764 
Income diversity 342 0.177* 0.120* ±0.038 0.737 
GDP 378 24.196 29.380 0.910 46.520 
Current acc. bal. 378 1.806 1.532 ±10.013 12.335 
  The sovereign debt crisis of 2011  
Log z 311 2.765 2.730 2.124 3.483 
MES 378 ±0.066 ±0.060 ±0.095 ±0.050 
Idiosyncratic 372 48.606 44.200 14.161 86.492 
Beta 310 1.072 1.028 0.358 1.852 
BHAR 369 ±0.283 ±0.253 ±0.711 0.068 
ROA 354 0.716 0.605 ±0.158 2.309 
Tier I capital  321 11.159 10.400 6.800 17.100 
Liquidity  356 14.668 11.400 3.180 34.980 
Deposit  356 62.306 66.421 19.819 91.981 
Funding fragility 356 17.710 10.310 0.484 67.742 
Loan 356 61.178 62.528 34.360 82.639 
Income diversity 354 0.144 0.100 ±0.021 0.490 
GDP  378 24.56 30.22 1.38 46.83 
Current acc. bal. 378 1.060 1.23 ±6.50 12.32 
Total assets (bn$) 352 204.00 45.20 13.33 1176.21 
  Country-level variables 
Concentration 378 0.52 0.50 0.32 0.85 
ADRI 378 3.69 4.00 1.00 5.00 
Institute  378 0.83 1.18 ±0.56 1.68 
Official 378 10.11 10.00 7.00 13.00 
Capital 378 5.91 6.00 4.00 8.00 
Restrict 378 9.52 10.00 5.00 13.00 
Private 378 6.74 7.00 5.00 8.00 
Deposit insurance 378 0.84 1.00 0.00 1.00 
 
The sample includes the largest 378 banks by asset size at the end of 2006 for which we could find 
accounting and share price data. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. ***, **, and * represent 
whether the means (medians) are significantly different between 2007±08 and 2011 at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2.Cross-country variation in selected variables. 
Country N Log Z 2007 
Log Z 
2011 MES 2007 MES 2011 
Idiosync 
2007 
Idiosync 
2011 
BETA 
2007 Beta 2011 
BHAR 
crisis07 
BHAR 
crisis11 
AUSTRALIA 6 1.140 1.048 ±0.078 ±0.060 0.271 0.407 1.12 1.15 ±0.637 ±0.253 
AUSTRIA 5 1.103 0.929 ±0.062 ±0.058 0.184 0.273 0.67 0.62 ±0.332 ±0.288 
CANADA 9 1.120 0.992 ±0.076 ±0.0568 0.267 0.407 0.63 1.10 ±0.556 ±0.167 
CHILE 5  1.109 ±0.112 ±0.203 0.454 0.823 0.87 0.98 ±0.471 ±0.36 
CHINA-PEOPLE'S REP. 18 0.704 1.013 ±0.068 ±0.058 0.434 0.415 1.01 0.95 ±0.529 ±0.22 
FRANCE 17 1.161 0.905 ±0.071 ±0.065 0.302 0.431 1.08 1.00 ±0.683 ±0.428 
GERMANY 8 1.048 0.942 ±0.074 ±0.075 0.357 0.519 1.34 1.16 ±0.692 ±0.348 
GREECE 6 1.188 1.018 ±0.075 ±0.103 0.436 0.734 1.43 1.32 ±0.759 ±0.902 
HONG KONG 6 1.193 1.132 ±0.078 ±0.061 0.326 0.298 1.19 0.89 ±0.570 ±0.258 
INDIA 28 1.007 1.014 ±0.071 ±0.061 0.574 0.491 1.07 1.04 ±0.483 ±0.500 
INDONESIA 6 1.198 1.176 ±0.092 ±0.072 1.087 0.674 1.09 1.24 ±0.654 ±0.212 
ISRAEL 5 1.053 1.047 ±0.066 ±0.068 0.340 0.451 1.12 1.12 ±0.578 ±0.403 
ITALY 21 0.937 1.031 ±0.069 ±0.068 0.302 0.478 0.93 0.91 ±0.552 ±0.485 
JAPAN 71 1.025 0.898 ±0.070 ±0.053 0.392 0.379 0.67 0.86 ±0.230 0.003 
POLAND 9 1.479 0.999 ±0.083 ±0.078 0.420 0.579 1.38 0.94 ±0.711 ±0.511 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 6 1.112 1.256 ±0.071 ±0.081 0.626 0.574 0.74 0.55 ±0.738 ±0.296 
SAUDI ARABIA 6 1.393 1.034 ±0.076 ±0.057 0.363 0.464 - 0.84 ±0.342 ±0.12 
SPAIN 13 1.126 1.018 ±0.064 ±0.073 0.378 0.554 0.99 0.93 ±0.577 ±0.453 
SWITZERLAND 5 1.296 0.986 ±0.078 ±0.070 0.380 0.649 1.48 1.67 ±0.604 ±0.438 
TAIWAN 5 1.035 1.015 ±0.061 ±0.060 0.518 0.530 1.01 1.05 ±0.313 ±0.281 
THAILAND 7 0.935 1.076 ±0.115 ±0.081 0.614 0.633 0.99 1.33 ±0.613 ±0.257 
TURKEY 8 1.246 1.209 ±0.079 ±0.073 0.770 0.568 1.16 1.18 ±0.634 ±0.454 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 6 1.208 1.003 ±0.070 ±0.054 0.476 0.416 - 1.30 ±0.406 ±0.071 
UNITED KINGDOM 16 0.779 0.858 ±0.081 ±0.0585 0.343 0.473 1.28 1.54 ±0.664 ±0.224 
USA 18 1.197 0.917 ±0.085 ±0.071 0.381 0.727 1.45 1.78 ±0.690 ±0.300 
The sample includes the largest 378 banks by asset size at the end of 2006 for which we could find accounting and share price data. In this table we present the results for countries 
that have at least 5 banks. BHAR 2007±08 is the buy-and-hold return for the sample banks during the June 2007 to December 2008 period. BHAR 11 is the buy-and-hold return from 
June 2011 until December 2011. Beta2007 is estimated on a regression of weekly stock returns of individual stocks in excess of 3-month T-bills against the MSCI World Index from 
June 2007 to December 2008. Idiosync2007 is the idiosyncratic volatility, which is the annualized standard deviation from the market model regression residuals that estimate 
beta2007. Beta2011 is estimated on a regression of the weekly stock returns of individual stocks in excess of 3-month T-bills against the MSCI World Index from June 2011 until 
December 2011. Idiosync2010 is the idiosyncratic volatility, which is the annualized standard deviation from the market model regression residuals that estimate beta2011.  
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Table 3.Risk analysis, the credit crisis. 
  Log z MES Idiosyncratic risk Beta 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Cons 4.532*** (12.45) 2.683*** (4.34) -10.348*** (-11.51) -12.103*** (-5.44) 52.856*** (5.83) 25.640 (1.28) 1.438*** (5.72) 0.041 (0.07) 
Official 0.022 (0.85) 0.012 (0.64) -0.059 (-0.99) -0.099 (-1.41) 1.728*** (2.88) 1.454** (2.32) 0.045*** (2.77) 0.066*** (3.50) 
Capital -0.043 (-1.24) 0.013 (0.47) 0.062 (0.81) 0.058 (0.59) -1.308** (-2.65) -0.734* (-1.83) -0.055** (-2.47) -0.028** (-2.03) 
Restriction -0.043* (-2.08) -0.034* (-1.74) 0.221*** (4.66) 0.269*** (3.94) -0.833* (-1.74) -0.937 (-1.49) -0.018 (-1.39) 0.000 (-0.01) 
Private monitoring  -0.151*** (-3.07) -0.115** (2.32) 0.174 (1.50) 0.294* (1.78) -1.275 (-1.10) -1.550 (-1.07) -0.057* (-1.79) -0.097** (-2.26) 
Deposit insurance -0.047*** (-2.36) -0.041** (2.35) -0.674** (-2.18) -0.690* (-1.69) 2.119*** (2.66) 2.626*** (2.70) 0.069 (0.77) 0.013 (0.12) 
BHAR 
  
0.001 (0.59) 
  
-0.003 (-0.62) 
  
0.093** (2.27) 
  
0.004*** (2.87) 
Tier 1 
  
0.101*** (8.90) 
  
0.057 (1.43) 
  
0.412 (1.12) 
  
-0.001 (-0.08) 
Funding fragility  
  
-0.001 (-0.58) 
  
0.006 (0.63) 
  
-0.284*** (-3.65) 
  
-0.002 (-0.70) 
Loans  
  
0.002 (0.55) 
  
-0.001 (-0.10) 
  
0.017 (0.17) 
  
-0.002 (-0.67) 
Income diversity  
  
-0.033 (-0.30) 
  
0.121 (0.31) 
  
0.990 (0.27) 
  
-0.081 (-0.79) 
Size 
  
-0.158** (-2.11) 
  
-0.124 (-0.47) 
  
6.083** (2.51) 
  
0.257*** (3.59) 
GDP per cap  
  
0.001 (0.22) 
  
0.003 (0.26) 
  
-0.144 (-1.60) 
  
0.005* (1.73) 
Current acc. bal. 
  
-0.006 (-1.23) 
  
-0.003 (-0.19) 
  
-0.201 (-1.27) 
  
-0.015*** (-2.92) 
Concentration 
  
0.532** (2.28) 
  
0.794 (0.94) 
  
5.247 (0.70) 
  
0.113 (0.49) 
ADRI 
  
-0.067 (-1.60) 
  
0.128 (0.87) 
  
0.056 (0.04) 
  
-0.021 (-0.49) 
  
                
  
                Adj. R2 (%) 
 
5.07 
 
35.86 
 
8.04 
 
6.72 
 
1.60 
 
9.28 
 
2.40 
 
17.54 
N 
 
312 
 
289 
 
350 
 
275 
 
378 
 
295 
 
341 
 
266 
All the variables are defined in Appendix I. All the accounting data are taken end of 2006. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for 
the regressions are estimated with country-level clustering. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 4.Stock market performance, the credit crisis. 
 
Dependent Variable: BHAR 2007-08 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Constant -118.438*** (-7.37) -68.023*** (-5.57) -63.911*** (-4.26) -46.089*** (-2.88) 
Official 1.824** (1.99) 2.888*** (4.90) 2.915*** (4.57) 2.641*** (4.08) 
Capital 1.33 (1.10) 0.983 (1.21) 0.05 (0.05) 0.665 (0.71) 
Restriction 2.009*** (2.62) 1.135** (2.27) 0.891** (2.32) 0.892* (2.27) 
Private monitoring 3.188* (1.69) 1.642*** (2.25) 2.806* (1.91) 1.573* (2.10) 
Deposit insurance -5.436 (-1.18) 3.749 (1.04) 7.796* (1.72) 3.977 (0.84) 
Tier1 0.649 (1.33) 0.616* (1.70) 0.731** (1.92) 0.257 (0.66) 
Log z 
  
-0.694 (-0.86) -0.68 (-0.85) -0.939 (-1.16) 
Idiosyncratic volatility 
  
-0.133* (-1.86) -0.267*** (-3.14) -0.206** (-2.48) 
Beta 
  
-43.362*** (-15.78) -39.225*** (-12.02) -41.394*** (-12.55) 
Funding fragility 
    
0.109 (1.38) 
  Deposit 
      
0.112 (1.70) 
Liquid 
    
-0.07 (-0.65) 
  Loan 
      
-0.279*** (-3.16) 
GDP per cap 
    
-0.286*** (-2.65) 
  Current acc. bal. 
    
0.422** (2.31) 0.099 (0.52) 
Concentration 
    
-9.595 (-1.20) -5.685 (-0.65) 
ADRI 
    
0.756 (0.50) 0.775 (0.52) 
Institution 
      
-0.923 (-0.34) 
  
        Adj. R2 (%) 
 
8.13 
 
61.98 
 
63.14 
 
63.71 
N 
 
275 
 
247 
 
247 
 
247 
The dependent variable is BHAR 2007±08 for the sample banks. BHAR 2007±08 is calculated for the sample banks during the June 2007 to December 2008 
period. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. All the accounting variables are pooled at the end of 2006. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
standard errors for the regressions are estimated with country-level clustering. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5.Risk analysis, the sovereign debt crisis. 
  Log z MES Idiosyncratic risk Beta 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Cons 3.414*** (14.31) 4.245*** (8.03) -7.291*** (-10.00) -7.891*** (-4.24) 36.818*** (4.62) 43.891*** (2.63) 1.541*** (8.45) 0.143 (0.39) 
Official -0.029* (-1.73) -0.006 (-0.34) -0.063 (-1.30) -0.123** (-1.96) 0.496 (0.94) 1.021* (1.85) 0.019* (1.66) 0.042*** (3.48) 
Capital 0.034 (1.52) 0.011 (0.43) 0.148*** (2.34) 0.043 (0.49) -1.889*** (-2.71) -0.448 (-0.58) -0.037** (-2.29) -0.022** (2.14) 
Restriction -0.008 (-0.61) -0.036** (-2.15) 0.123*** (3.17) 0.227*** (3.94) -0.364 (-0.86) -1.676*** (-3.17) -0.012 (-1.30) -0.015 (-1.26) 
Private monitoring  -0.059* (-1.88) -0.053** (-2.41) -0.067 (-0.72) -0.188 (-1.39) 0.151 (0.15) 3.066*** (2.56) -0.047** (-2.04) -0.020* (-1.76) 
Deposit insurance -0.082 (-0.97) -0.043 (-0.46) -0.939*** (-3.74) -0.834*** (-2.60) 10.027*** (3.55) 9.967*** (3.36) -0.004 (-0.07) 0.073 (1.11) 
BHAR  
 
0.002*** (2.78) 
  
0.001 (0.39) 
  
0.100*** (3.66) 
  
0.004*** (6.18) 
Tier 1  
 
0.033*** (3.81) 
  
0.008 (0.27) 
  
-0.785*** (-3.15) 
  
-0.007 (-1.32) 
Funding Fragility   
 
0.000 (0.19) 
  
-0.003 (-0.32) 
  
-0.016 (-0.23) 
  
-0.001 (-0.71) 
Loans   
 
0.000 (0.10) 
  
-0.002 (-0.23) 
  
-0.043 (-0.52) 
  
0.000 (-0.16) 
Income diversity   
 
-0.203 (-1.22) 
  
0.507 (0.87) 
  
-14.170*** (-2.68) 
  
0.020 (0.18) 
Size  
 
-0.036 (-0.57) 
  
-0.02 (-0.09) 
  
-0.044 (-0.02) 
  
0.189*** (4.31) 
GDP per cap   
 
-0.004* (-1.65) 
  
0.004 (0.42) 
  
0.02 (0.24) 
  
0.006*** (3.22) 
Current acc. bal.  
 
0.001 (0.09) 
  
0.031 (1.54) 
  
-1.028*** (-5.49) 
  
-0.012*** (-2.93) 
Concentration  
 
-0.23 (-1.18) 
  
0.359 (0.51) 
  
4.659 (0.75) 
  
0.070 (0.52) 
ADRI  
 
-0.011 (-0.31) 
  
0.336*** (2.66) 
  
-4.679*** (-4.09) 
  
-0.093*** (-3.72) 
   
                              
   
               Adj. R2 (%)  3.59 
 
16.72 
 
7.55 
 
7.54 
 
3.10 
 
24.74 
 
2.00 
 
31.38 
N  320 
 
316 
 
351 
 
299 
 
378 
 
320 
 
341 
 
288 
All the variables are defined in Appendix I. All the accounting data are taken end of 2010 t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors for the 
regressions are estimated with country level clustering. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Stock market performance, the sovereign debt crisis 
 
Dependent Variable: BHAR 2010-11 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Constant -85.803*** (-6.59) -50.931*** (-2.83) -30.512 (-1.62) -61.175*** (-3.19) 
Official 2.419*** (3.08) 2.780*** (3.80) 1.523** (2.21) 0.403*** (2.59) 
Capital 0.603 (0.58) -0.091 (-0.10) -1.384 (-1.40) 0.397 (0.40) 
Restriction -0.155 (-0.24) -0.398 (-0.66) -0.113 (-0.16) 0.032 (0.05) 
Private monitoring 5.018*** (3.49) 5.187*** (3.44) 2.852** (1.86) 2.567* (1.79) 
Deposit insurance -12.010*** (-3.11) -2.976*** (-2.72) -3.608*** (-2.83) -4.332*** (-2.95) 
Tier1 0.651* (1.85) 0.012 (0.03) 0.078 (0.23) 0.610* (1.78) 
Log z 
  
-3.242 (-1.26) -3.249 (-1.38) -0.515 (-0.22) 
Idiosyncratic volatility 
  
-0.627*** (-6.82) -0.498*** (-5.85) -0.458*** (-5.65) 
Beta 
  
-0.966 (-0.27) -1.6 (-0.49) 0.407 (0.13) 
Funding fragility 
    
-0.296*** (-3.33) 
  Deposit 
      
0.369*** (5.60) 
Liquid 
    
0.012 (0.09) 
  Loan 
      
0.014 (0.15) 
GDP per cap 
    
0.097 (0.92) 
  Current acc. bal. 
    
1.493*** (6.29) 1.284*** (5.69) 
Concentration 
    
-10.272 (-1.29) -21.644 (-2.51) 
ADRI 
    
3.138* (2.02) 1.332 (0.89) 
Institution 
      
8.881*** (3.41) 
  
        Adj. R2 (%) 
 
11.93 
 
36.46 
 
49.63 
 
54.57 
N 
 
311 
 
273 
 
273 
 
273 
The dependent variable is BHAR 2011 for the sample banks. BHAR 2011is calculated from June 2011 to December 2011. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix I. All the accounting variables are pooled at the end of 2010. t-statistics are reported in parentheses . The standard errors for the regressions are 
estimated with country-level clustering. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7. Robustness checks: Risk regressions. 
  
MES 
Jan 2010±Dec 2011 
MES 
May 2010±Dec 2011 
Idiosyncratic risk 
Jan 2010±Dec 2011 
Idiosyncratic risk 
May 2010±Dec 2011 
Beta 
Jan 2010±Dec 2011 
Beta 
May 2010±Dec 2011 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Cons -6.179*** (-3.73) -6.504*** (-3.87) 0.964* (1.80) 52.419*** (3.00) -0.828* (-1.90) -0.817* (-1.88) 
Official -0.086 (-1.55) -0.100* (-1.76) -0.395 (-0.53) 0.942* (1.64) -0.033** (-2.31) -0.034** (-2.41) 
Capital -0.044 (-0.57) -0.012 (-0.15) -1.253*** (-2.43) -0.418 (-0.52) 0.039* (1.94) 0.040* (2.02) 
Restriction 0.111** (2.16) 0.125** (2.40) 1.247 (1.09) -1.337** (-2.42) -0.014 (-0.99) -0.013 (-0.95) 
Private monitoring  -0.232* (-1.92) -0.265* (-2.17) 5.930* (2.09) 1.571 (1.28) 0.038 (1.24) 0.041 (1.34) 
Deposit insurance -0.778*** (-2.72) -0.852*** (-2.93) 0.023 (0.89) 6.507** (2.15) 0.382*** (5.06) 0.374*** (4.96) 
BHAR 0.003 (1.06) 0.004 (1.43) -0.678*** (-2.84) 0.022 (0.77) 0.005*** (7.64) 0.005*** (7.59) 
Tier 1 -0.012 (-0.42) -0.007 (-0.25) -0.01 (-0.15) -0.731*** (-2.87) -0.011* (-1.77) -0.011* (-1.80) 
Funding fragility  0.002 (0.24) 0.001 (0.11) 0.026 (0.32) -0.005 (-0.07) 0.003* (1.82) 0.003* (1.82) 
Loans  -0.001 (-0.08) 0.001 (0.12) -4.726 (-0.93) 0.029 (0.33) 0.001 (0.47) 0.001 (0.45) 
Income diversity  0.818 (1.57) 0.787 (1.49) -2.627 (-1.32) -4.997 (-0.92) -0.179 (-1.33) -0.172 (-1.27) 
Size 0.07 (0.36) 0.114 (0.57) -0.179* (-2.19) -2.753 (-1.30) 0.279*** (5.27) 0.274*** (5.18) 
GDP per cap  -0.007 (-0.83) -0.004 (-0.45) -0.560*** (-3.10) -0.189* (-2.17) 0.013*** (6.09) 0.013*** (6.20) 
Current acc. bal. 0.013 (0.70) 0.016 (0.89) 6.297 (1.03) -0.601*** (-3.12) -0.035*** (-7.31) -0.034*** (-7.07) 
Concentration 0.519 (0.83) 0.477 (0.75) -2.344* (-2.11) 6.763 (1.04) 0.290* (1.78) 0.291* (1.79) 
ADRI 0.184 (1.63) 0.177 (1.55) 51.975*** (3.18) -2.403* (-2.03) -0.153*** (-5.18) -0.154*** (-5.22) 
  
          
  
  
          
  
Adj. R2 (%) 
 
8.70 
 
10.72 
 
11.28 
 
11.21 
 
57.50  57.06 
N 
 
299 
 
299 
 
313 
 
313 
 
313  313 
The dependent variable is MES from May 2010 until the end of 2011 in Panel A and MES from beginning of 2010 until the end of 2011 for the sample banks. 
All the variables are defined in Appendix I. The accounting variables for the sovereign debt crisis are taken at the end of 2010. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with bank-level clustering. ***, **, * represents significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 8. Robustness checks: Return regressions. 
  sovereign debt crisis - BHAR(Jan 2010±Dec 2011) sovereign debt crisis - BHAR (May 2010±Dec 2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Constant 7.370 (0.26) -27.693 (-1.10) -30.512 (-1.62) -27.693 (-1.10) 
Official 3.098*** (2.78) 1.383*** (2.64) 1.523** (2.21) 1.383*** (2.69) 
Capital 1.383 (0.96) 0.875 (0.79) -1.384 (-1.40) 0.875 (0.79) 
Restriction -0.919 (-1.01) -1.05 (-1.58) -0.113 (-0.16) -1.05 (-1.58) 
Private monitoring -1.475 (-0.70) 1.932 (1.21) 2.852* (1.86) 1.932 (1.21) 
Deposit insurance -12.087*** (-2.22) -14.647*** (-3.32) -3.608*** (-2.83) -14.647*** (-3.32) 
Tier1 0.302 (0.60) 0.891** (1.99) 0.078 (0.23) 0.891* (1.99) 
Log z -3.468 (-0.98) -1.109 (-0.37) -3.249 (-1.38) -1.109 (-0.37) 
Idiosyncratic volatility -0.526*** (-4.11) -0.530*** (-4.99) -0.498*** (-5.85) -0.530*** (-4.99) 
Beta 4.125 (0.84) 4.241 (1.04) -1.6 (-0.49) 4.241 (1.04) 
Funding fragility -0.362*** (-2.71) 
  
-0.296*** (-3.33) 
  Deposit 
  
0.423*** (4.91) 
  
0.423*** (4.91) 
Liquid -0.025 (-0.13) 
  
0.012 (0.09) 
  Loan 
  
0.141 (1.21) 
  
0.141 (1.21) 
GDP per cap -0.277* (-1.74) 
  
0.097 (0.92) 
  Current acc. bal. 2.567*** (7.19) 2.153*** (7.29) 1.493*** (6.29) 2.153*** (7.29) 
Concentration -2.727 (-0.23) -14.775 (-1.31) -10.272 (-1.29) -14.775 (-1.31) 
ADRI 6.093** (2.61) 1.343 (0.69) 3.138** (2.02) 1.343 (0.69) 
Institution     7.127** (2.09)     7.127** (2.09) 
  
        Adj. R2 (%) 
 
33.80 
 
42.83 
 
49.63 
 
42.83 
N 
 
273 
 
273 
 
273 
 
273 
The dependent variable is BHAR from May 2010 until the end of 2011 in Panel A and BHAR from beginning of 2010 until the end of 2011 for sample 
banks. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. The accounting variables for the sovereign debt crisis are taken at end of 2010. t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated with bank-level clustering. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
